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This study quantifies the impact of oil price shocks and the subsequent monetary policy 
response on output for Pakistan. It employs a quarterly Structural Vector Auto-regression 
framework for the period 1993–2015. It first discovers that Hamilton’s (1996) Net Oil Price 
Increase indicator appropriately reveals most of the oil price shocks hitting Pakistan’s 
economy. We find that a contractionary monetary policy, resulting from the oil price shocks, 
contributes to significant output loss in Pakistan. After encountering the Lucas critique, the 
present study finds that around 42 percent of the output loss is due to the ensuing tight 
monetary policy. This suggests that the central bank of Pakistan can reduce the impact of oil 
price shocks by reducing its intervention in the market. 
JEL Classification:  E1, E3, E5 
Keywords: Oil Price Shocks, Monetary Policy, Structural Vector Autoregression 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Applying two simulation methods [Sims and Zha (1996); Bernanke, et al. (2004); 
Nusair (2016);  Razmi, et al. (2016)], we find that a contractionary monetary policy 
resulting from the oil price shocks contributes to an output loss in Pakistan. Figure 1 
elaborates a negative relationship between the oil price shocks and the tight monetary 
policy response pursued by the central bank of Pakistan. 
 
Fig. 1. Oil Price Shocks and Monetary Policy in Pakistan 
 
Note: NOPI is the oil price shock and CMR is call money rate. Further details of these variables are available in 
data section. 
 
Muhammad Zeshan <muh.zeshan@gmail.com> is Senior Research Fellow, Pakistan Institute of 
Development Economics, Islamabad. Wasim Shahid Malik <wsmalick@gmail.com> is Associate Professor, 
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Muhammad Nasir <nasirawan84@yahoo.com> is Senior Research 
Economist, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1
9
9
2
Q
3
1
9
9
3
Q
2
1
9
9
4
Q
1
1
9
9
4
Q
4
1
9
9
5
Q
3
1
9
9
6
Q
2
1
9
9
7
Q
1
1
9
9
7
Q
4
1
9
9
8
Q
3
1
9
9
9
Q
2
2
0
0
0
Q
1
2
0
0
0
Q
4
2
0
0
1
Q
3
2
0
0
2
Q
2
2
0
0
3
Q
1
2
0
0
3
Q
4
2
0
0
4
Q
3
2
0
0
5
Q
2
2
0
0
6
Q
1
2
0
0
6
Q
4
2
0
0
7
Q
3
2
0
0
8
Q
2
2
0
0
9
Q
1
2
0
0
9
Q
4
2
0
1
0
Q
3
2
0
1
1
Q
2
2
0
1
2
Q
1
2
0
1
2
Q
4
2
0
1
3
Q
3
2
0
1
4
Q
2
2
0
1
5
Q
1
2
0
1
5
Q
4
NOPI CMR
66 Zeshan, Malik, and Nasir 
Further, Knittel and Roberts (2005) suggest that a positive shock to oil price 
represents an unexpected demand shock driven by global economic activity. Each 
simulation method gives the same message that a tighter monetary policy resulting from 
oil price shocks increases output loss. The output loss from the monetary policy is around 
12 percent in the Sims and Zha (1996) scenario while it is around 42 percent in Bernanke, 
et al. (2004) scenario. It is important to note that the latter scenario provides robust 
results as it encounters the Lucas critique. On the other hand, the oil price shocks alone 
are responsible for the remaining 88 percent of output loss in Sims and Zha (1996) 
scenario and for a 58  percent output loss in Bernanke, et al. (2004) scenarios.  
During the fiscal year 2012-13, primary energy supply in Pakistan was around 64, 
727 thousand tons of oil equivalent (TOEs), as compared to 64,522 thousand TOEs 
during the last year. This indicates a growth rate of 0.32 percent. On the other hand, final 
energy consumption during 2012-13 was around 40, 026 thousand TOE. The growth rate 
of energy consumption has increased by 3.1 percent. This energy consumption is highly 
skewed in favour of natural gas and oil consumption, Figure 2 portrays a detailed analysis 
of the energy mix in Pakistan. 
 
Fig. 2. Energy Mix in Pakistan for 2012-13 
 
Source: Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan, 2012-13.  
Note: During 2012-13, final energy consumption in Pakistan was around 40, 026 thousand TOE. 
 
For decades, oil price shocks have been held responsible for prolonged recessions 
worldwide. This assertion is based on the close correlation between the oil price shocks 
and economic downturns. The fact that oil price shocks precede all the major recessions 
further strengthens this claim [Hamilton (1983)]. Nonetheless, all the economists do not 
share the same opinion. A few believe that neither oil price shocks [Bruno and Sachs 
(1985)] nor the oil intensity has something to do with the recession [Baily (1982)], as the 
energy expenses account for a meagre share in the total cost. There appears to be some 
other factor worsening the situation and Bohi (1991) believes that it is a tighter monetary 
stance of the monetary authorities in the face of oil shocks. 
Being a net oil importer, Pakistan is prone to international oil price shocks in terms of 
output loss and inflation. This also points to the importance of variations in the nominal and 
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real exchange rates for the reason that a decrease in the value of rupee will increase the burden 
of import bill, thereby affecting the economic activity. Figure A1 (Appendix B) shows the 
variations in the real and nominal exchange rates for Pakistan in the first decade of the new 
millennium. Moreover, given a narrow oil supply base, an unexpected increase in oil price 
(which is a demand shock) makes the economy more fragile. Consequently, any oil price 
shock becomes a matter of concern for the monetary authorities in setting the policy rate, so as 
to minimise the welfare loss to the society. However, the dilemma is that a tight monetary 
stance to limit inflation may result in more output loss through the investment channel of 
demand. In this backdrop, it is very important to investigate the nature of the relationship 
between oil price shocks and the subsequent monetary policy. 
The only study in Pakistan in this perspective is that of Malik (2008), who finds 
that oil price shocks have a significant and asymmetric relationship with macroeconomic 
variables. Nevertheless, the study is limited in the sense that it does not discriminate 
between the anticipated and unanticipated policy responses.
1
  Unfortunately, no study till 
date, including the aforementioned one, has explicitly distinguished between the output 
loss, associated with oil price shocks and the one due to the endogenous monetary policy 
response. Hence, the present study finds an opportunity to fill this gap in the literature.  
The rest of the study is organised as follows: the literature review is given in 
Section 2. The third section describes the theoretical framework and econometric 
modelling. Section 4 presents a brief description of data and variables. The results are 
discussed in Section 5 while Section 6 concludes the study and provides policy 
recommendations. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is extensive literature on the nexus between oil price (demand) shock, 
economic fluctuations and monetary policy [Nusair (2016); Razmi, et al. (2016);  Elwell 
(2013); Alquist and Coibion (2013)]. Macro-economists differ on the appropriate policy 
response by the monetary authorities to oil shocks [Hetzel (2013); Meltzer, et al. (2013)]. 
Gordon (1975), for instance, favoured monetary accommodation, in case the economy is 
hit by an adverse supply shock. Blinder (1981) argued in favour of monetary contraction 
in such situations. Nonetheless, Fischer (1985) advised the monetary authorities to 
restrain from any response as long as the workers do not resist any real change in wages.  
It was believed for years that output loss in an economy facing oil price shocks is 
entirely the consequence of these shocks. However, it was the pioneering work of Bohi 
(1991) which considered the tight monetary policy following oil price shocks as the main 
cause of the output loss. Dotsey and Reid (1992) also shared the same view. However, 
these studies fail to quantify the production shortfall associated with the oil price shocks 
and the systematic monetary policy. This gap was filled by Bernanke, et al. (1997) by 
employing monthly VAR for this purpose. Results showed that oil price shocks induced a 
significant policy response in the form of increased interest rate. The identification 
problem made it difficult for them to separate the production loss associated with both the 
shocks and the subsequent monetary policy. To deal with this problem, the study 
employed Sims and Zha (1996) counterfactual experiments to observe that oil price 
 
1Also, this study has not considered the financial reforms of 1990s that allowed the State Bank of 
Pakistan (the central bank of Pakistan, SBP) for market determined policy rate. 
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shocks have a minor negative impact on the real GDP, while the resulting tight monetary 
policy was responsible for 2/3 to 3/4 of the output loss. This was the first effort of sorting 
out the effect of the systematic monetary policy on the economic activity in the face of oil 
shocks. Following Bernanke, et al. (1997), Lee, et al. (2001) uncovered that oil price 
shocks had the potential to predict movements in the monetary policy in response to the 
oil shocks in Japan with 30 percent to 50 percent of the output loss attributable to the 
systematic monetary policy. 
Nonetheless, the findings of Bernanke, et al. (1997) were questioned for two 
reasons. First, the strength and accuracy of the counterfactual experiments were doubtful, 
thereby leading to the so called Lucas critique. Secondly, the lag length selected by 
Bernanke, et al. (1997) was not appropriate [Hamilton and Herrera (2004)].  This second 
query is raised on the basis that oil shocks take three to four quarters in revealing their 
impact on output [Herrera (2007); Hamilton (2003)]. Therefore, for monthly data, it is 
advisable to place 12 lags instead of 7 as was done in Bernanke, et al. (1997). Hamilton 
and Herrera (2004) exercised the same dataset used in Bernanke, et al. (1997) and 
employed VAR framework for analysis. The study concluded that the lag length mis-
specification in Bernanke, et al. (1997) was behind the huge output loss that was assumed 
to be associated with the systematic monetary policy. The study further claimed that the 
monetary policy would no more be responsible for output loss if the lag length is 
extended to 12. 
Bernanke, et al. (2004) tried to settle the issues contemporaneously. The study 
argued that excessive lags could enhance the uncertainty in the model rather than 
avoiding the variable omission bias. Consequently, they employed 4 lags but with 
quarterly data, so as to ensure a more parsimonious model along with minimum 
uncertainty and mean square error. Moreover, they preferred to delay the policy response 
for four quarters instead of completely shutting it off in the model. Because a transitory 
deviation cannot deform the structure of the economy completely, it provided a possible 
solution for the Lucas critique as well. This experiment exhibited that the endogenous 
monetary policy was still responsible for half of the output loss, a bit lesser than their 
previous findings. Working with 6 lags, it again verified association of the output loss 
with the ensuing tight monetary policy. 
Following Bernanke, et al. (2004), Herrera and Pesavento (2009) used quarterly 
data to minimise uncertainty in the sample data. With 4 lag length and delayed policy 
response for 1 year, the study came up with the same view as asserted previously. 
Splitting the data into two sets, owing to some structural break, it declared that the 
systematic monetary policy had some dampening impact on the economy during the 
1970s with no contribution in the economic downturn in the later years.  
In an attempt to evaluate the validity of Bernanke, et al. (2004), Carlstrom and 
Fuerst (2005) estimated a calibrated version of the General Equilibrium Model. It was 
suggested that unanticipated policy in terms of delayed policy response could minimise 
the output loss. Leduc and Sill (2004) also conducted various policy scenarios to evaluate 
the economic performance within the same framework and the results were consistent 
with the Bernanke, et al. (1997, 2004). Lee and Song (2009) concluded that the 
accommodative monetary policy trims down the output volatility without raising inflation 
significantly.  
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3.  ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) 
The SVAR is the most extensively used framework for the analysis of oil shocks 
and monetary policy. This framework is especially helpful in quantifying the output loss. 
Hence, following Kliem and Kriwoluzky (2013), Lange (2013) and Bernanke, et al. 
(1997, 2004) among others, we estimate a Structural VAR.
2
  
However, Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) state that the presence of a censored 
variable (which is NOPI in the present case) will make the impulse responses 
inconsistent. To avoid this problem, Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) suggest to use oil price 
such that it is predetermined with respect to other macroeconomic variables. This is 
evident from Equation 1 where (domestic real) oil price is dependent only on the 
predetermined macroeconomic variables. Further, the study suggests to use NOPI in all 
other equations other than the oil price equation. 
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Here DROPt is the domestic real oil prices, Yt is the real GDP, CPIt is the Consumer Price 
Index, CMRt  is the call money rate, NOPIt is Hamilton’s (1996) oil price indicator and 
finally i are the white noise structural shocks. 
The SVAR can be estimated with the help 
 
2Initial literature considered the exclusion of commodity prices from a VAR framework as a reason for 
the price puzzle. Sims (1992) suggested the inclusion of commodity prices in order to avoid this puzzle. 
However, Leeper, et al. (1996) argued that the inclusion of commodity prices without theoretical justifications 
may also result in some serious specification bias. Fortunately, there is no price puzzle in the present study so it 
does not use commodity price index. It provides us two additional benefits. First it avoids the use of the ad-hoc 
based commodity price index in the VAR framework. Second, it makes the model more parsimonious and 
thereby reduces uncertainty in its estimates. 
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of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique, since it contains the same independent 
variables on the right hand side (RHS). Nonetheless, a different composition of the right 
hand side variables will require the Seemingly Unrelated Regression [Enders (2004)]. 
This estimation is performed in two steps. First, it estimates the reduced form parameters 
of the system. Second, it derives the structural parameters of the model for inferential 
analysis. Equations 1-4 summarise the identifying restriction for the estimation of 
structural parameters; it is based on Kilian and Vigfusson (2011). In these equations, oil 
price is predetermined with respect to other macroeconomic variables. It is domestic real 
oil price, dependent only on the predetermined macroeconomic variables. The rest of the 
identifying restrictions are as follows: since Pakistan is the net oil importer, it cannot 
affect international oil prices. However, being a net importer, it is affected by oil price 
shocks. Due to inertia, output is contemporaneously affected neither by oil price nor by 
interest rate. Finally, the interest rate does not affect prices in the same period due to 
rigidities in the economy.  
 
3.2.  Sims-Zha Counterfactual Experiments  
Next we discuss how the output losses, due to the rising oil price and the 
subsequent tight monetary policy, can be separated, using the Sims-Zha framework. Sims 
and Zha (1996) made the first effort to quantify the impact of the endogenous monetary 
policy in the VAR framework, by shutting-off the monetary policy response.  
Historically, a central bank tightens monetary policy in response to rising oil prices 
because it fears that higher oil prices would increase inflation and inflationary 
expectations. Hence, it is not only the oil price increase that is contributing to the 
macroeconomic changes but also tighter monetary policy. From a policy perspective, it 
would be important to know which factor (oil price increase or tight monetary policy) is 
contributing how much in the changing macroeconomic activity.  
In order to separate the output losses resulting from the oil price increase and the 
tight monetary policy, shutting-off the monetary policy would provide only the 
contribution of oil price increase to the change in macro-economy. It is important to note 
that the interest rate is primary policy rate used by the policy-makers. Shuting-off the 
monetary policy (interest rate) means that it should remain the same as it was before the 
oil price increase [Sims and Zha (1996)]. 
The monetary policy becomes non-responsive to the macroeconomic 
fluctuations and plays a passive role only. The output loss due to tight monetary 
policy is then the difference between the output losses occurred with and without 
shut-off cases. Nonetheless, this unexpected policy response results in the Lucas 
critique; the reason is that Sims and Zha (1996) scenario considers that the behaviour 
of economic agents is invariant to this policy change. In practice, any simulation in 
this way would lead to the Lucas critique as, in the shut-off case, the policy is not 
responding in a historical way. 
Sims and Zha (1996) find that an unpredictable shift in the monetary policy 
accounts for a little variation in the historical macroeconomic fluctuations. Further, it 
finds a small variation in policy rate in response to such variations. It concludes that most 
of the monetary policy reactions are systematically in response to business cycle changes. 
In such situation, assessment of systematic monetary policy becomes more important. 
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This framework estimates such a monetary policy reaction function in which the 
policy variable is completely unresponsive to any shock. In other words, the central bank 
does not allow for any change in policy in response to a macroeconomic disturbance. 
Further, this framework does not allow for any change in behaviour of private sector 
agents. It assumes that private agents fully understand the new policy. 
Data reveals that interest rate increases in response to an oil price shock, which is a 
historical fact, but the above mentioned practice with simulation is not conducted 
following this historical response to the interest rate.  This is an alarming issue as in the 
presence of Lucas critique all the policy simulations would be worthless. Fortunately, this 
problem is solved in Bernanke, et al. (2004) by delaying the response of monetary policy 
for a year instead of completely shutting it off. Since a transitory deviation of the 
monetary policy from the traditional policy response will not deform the economic 
structure completely, the effect of Lucas critique is minimal in this case. 
 
4.  DATA AND VARIABLES 
The present study uses the following main variables: real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), Consumer Price Index (CPI), domestic real oil prices (DROP), the Hamilton’s 
(1996) oil price indicator (Net Oil Price Increase, NOPI) and the Call Money Rate 
(CMR).
3
 It uses quarterly data for the period 1993 to 2015.
4
  All these series are in real 
terms, denominated in the million rupees with 2000 as the base year. 
Energy prices are state-controlled in Pakistan. These prices may not be perfect 
representatives of international oil price behaviour, yet we also use them in our analysis 
to judge their impact on the economy. Domestically controlled energy prices comprise of 
Gasoline, Kerosene, High Speed Diesel Oil (HSDO), Light Diesel Oil (LDO) and HOBC. 
Data for quarterly GDP have been obtained from Kemal and Arby (2005). However, 
quarterly GDP available only till 2004-05. Data for the remaining period are acquired from 
Nasir and Malik (2011). The data for international oil prices are taken from the Illinois Oil 
and Gas Association (IOGA). The IOGA was established in 1944 in the United States to 
provide information to its stakeholders about the energy inputs. Pakistan Energy Year Book 
is consulted for data on domestic energy prices. The data for both prices and call money 
rate are taken from various reports of the State Bank of Pakistan. 
 
5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
For the sake of convenience, this section has been divided into three subsections. 
The first subsection 5.1 provides the results of unit root test. The second subsection 5.2 
portrays the impulse responses of output loss. Finally, the last subsection 5.3 sorts out the 
output loss, resulting from the oil price shocks and the systematic monetary policy. 
 
3The selection procedure for an oil price indicator has been specified in Appendix. 
4
A model with monthly data may raise the sampling error significantly, for the uncertainty is intensified 
in the presence of large number of variables in the model. The issue even worsens if the lag length is also large. 
A quarterly series ensures a parsimonious model, with minimum uncertainty and mean square error [Bernanke, 
et al. (2004)]. This provides motivation for the use of quarterly data in this empirical analysis. One might argue 
to use the annual data for a more parsimonious model. However, annual data is unable to capture the true 
dynamics of the economy which the quarterly data can. The data is deseasonalised to control for seasonality 
effects.  
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5.1.  Results of Unit Root Test and Lag Selection 
Results of unit root tests indicate that three out of the four variables are non-
stationary (see Table 1). More specifically, just NOPI is stationary while the CMR, CPI 
and the GDP are I (1). The standard econometric practice  suggests to use the integrated 
variables with first difference. The results of the ADF test indicate that all the integrated 
variables are stationary at the first difference with varying level of significance. Hence, 
the present study employs CMR, CPI and the GDP with the first difference while the 
DROP and NOPI with level form. 
 
Table 1 
 Results of Unit Root Test 
 
Variables 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test 
Level First Differernce 
CMR –2.5 –7.2*** 
CPI –0.98 –4.3** 
GDP –2.1 –3.2* 
DROP –3.9** –9.15*** 
NOPI –5.1*** –8.23*** 
Note: NOPI is stationary while the CMR, CPI and the GDP are integrated of I (1). 
***, ** and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
 
The present study takes the help of HQC (Hannan-Quinn criterion) and AIC 
(Akaike criterion) for lag selection, see Table 3 for details. The former criterion specifies 
the use of 4 lags [consistent with Bernanke, et al. (2004)] while the latter criterion 
specifies the use of 5 lags. As Bernanke, et al. (2004) suggests the use of 4 lags with 
quarterly data, the primary study estimates the baseline estimation with the 4 lags. 
However, it also estimates a robustness test with a 5 lag model, suggested by our AIC 
test. The detailed results of both of these models (models with 4 lags and 5 lags) have 
been explained in the next section.  
 
Table 2 
 Lag Selection Criteria 
Lags HQC (Hannan-Quinn Criterion) AIC (Akaike Criterion) 
1 –9.45 –9.66 
2 –10.08 –10.42 
3 –10.07 –10.53 
4 –10.23* –10.82 
5 –10.14 –10.85* 
6 –9.97 –10.81 
7 –9.76 –10.73 
8 –9.63 –10.72 
* Indicates the best (that is, minimised) values. 
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5.2.  Impulse Responses of Output Loss  
The Figures 3, 5 and 7 show the output loss, resulting from a systematic monetary 
policy, non-systematic monetary policy [Sims-Zha Scenario] and delayed monetary 
policy [Bernanke, et al. (2004) scenario]. All these models have been estimated with 4 
lags.
5
  Results show that the oil price shocks have an adverse  impact on the economy. 
This impact is more pronounced if the monetary authorities operate aggressively with a 
systematic monetary policy to control the forthcoming inflationary episode. However, in 
the absence of a systematic (or with a delayed) monetary policy, the impact of the oil 
price shocks on the macroeconomic downturn can be reduced significantly. Further, it is 
evident that the economy has an early tendency of convergence after encountering the 
Lucas critique, see Figure 7, while there is no such tendency in the other case.  
For a diagnostic analysis, the present study checks the distribution of residuals 
through the Doornik-Hansen test. Under the null hypothesis of normality, the Doornik-
Hansen test determines the distribution characteristics of residuals of an estimated model. 
Test results show that the null of each of the three models is accepted. It means residuals 
of these models are normally distributed which signifies the robustness of all these 
models, see Table 4. 
The present study also runs robustness tests, but with 5 lags. The Figures 4, 6 and 
8 show the output loss resulting from a systematic monetary policy, non-systematic 
monetary policy [Sims-Zha Scenario] and delayed monetary policy [Bernanke, et al. 
(2004) scenario]. All these estimated models convey the same message but the 5 lag 
models are more volatile than the 4 lag models. Though the results of 5 lag models are 
consistent with 4 lag models, but they are less stable over time.   
 
Fig. 3.  Output Loss with Systematic Monetary Policy 
(4 lag model) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The impact of oil price shocks is more devastating if the monetary authorities operate aggressively with a 
systematic monetary policy to control the forthcoming inflationary episode. (These are the standard 
results of gretl software with a 95 percent level of confidence.) 
 
5 Our model is identified locally and globally. Further, the covariance matrix of residuals is full and the 
matrix of structural shocks is diagonal.  
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Fig. 4. Output Loss with Systematic Monetary Policy  
(5 lag model)
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The impact of systemetic monetary policy is devastating and more volatile with a 5 lag model. This 
model converges after a long period of time compared to a 4 lag model. (These are the standard results of 
gretl software with a 95 percent level of confidence.) 
 
Fig. 5.  Output Loss with a Non-systematic Monetary Policy [Sims-Zha Scenario]  
(4 lag model) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: In the absence of a systematic monetary policy, the adverse impact of the oil price shock of 
macroeconomic downturn can be reduced by 12 percent.  (These are the standard results of gretl software 
with a 95 percent level of confidence.) 
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Fig. 6. Output Loss with a Non-systematic Monetary Policy [Sims-Zha Scenario] 
(5 lag model) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The impact of systemetic monetary policy is devastating and more volatile with a 5 lag model. This 
model converges after a long period of time compared to a 4 lag model. (These are the standard results of 
gretl software with a 95 percent level of confidence.) 
 
 
Fig. 7. Output Loss with a Delayed Monetary Policy  
[Bernanke, et al. (2004) Scenario] 
(4 lag model) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: In the absence of a systematic monetary policy, the adverse impact of the oil price shock of 
macroeconomic downturn can be reduced by 42 percent. (These are the standard results of gretl software 
with a 95 percent level of confidence.) 
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Fig. 8. Output Loss with a Delayed Monetary Policy  
[Bernanke, et al. (2004) Scenario] 
(5 lag model) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The impact of systemetic monetary policy is devastating and more volatile with a 5 lag model. This 
model converges after a long period of time compared to a 4 lag model. (These are the standard results of 
gretl software with a 95 percent level of confidence.) 
 
Table 3 
 Distribution of Residuals 
Doornik-Hansen 
Systemetic Monetary 
Policy Scenario 
Bernanke 
Scenario 
Sims-Zha 
Scenario 
Test Statistic 9.12 9.59 10.04 
 
5.3.  Quantification of Output Loss 
With the help of these three impulse response scenarios, we attribute the output 
loss to oil shocks and the subsequent tight monetary policy. This output loss, calculated 
for 12 quarters (three years) is given in Table 5. The table has 2 major blocks. The first 
block presents two different scenarios which control the systematic response of monetary 
policy, while the second block illustrates the respective shares of output loss due to the 
oil price shock and the monetary policy.  
Two important points emerge from this table. First, the contractionary monetary 
policy contributes to output loss. Second, in Sims-Zha and Bernanke, et al. (2004) 
scenarios, the monetary policy contributes around 12 percent and 42 percent in the output 
losses respectively. It is important to note that the latter case is more robust as it 
encounters the Lucas critique. The oil price shocks are responsible for around 88 percent 
and 58 percent of the output losses in the respective scenarios. It indicates that an 
endogenous monetary policy contributes significantly in the output loss. In other words, 
if the State Bank of Pakistan avoids interfering the supply side shocks, to control 
inflation, the output loss will be minimal.
6
 
 
6
Same practice is repeated for the domestically controlled energy prices such as Gasoline, Kerosene, 
High Speed Diesel Oil (HSDO), Light Diesel Oil (LDO) and HOBC. No energy shock was able to produce any 
well behaved response in the series. One possible reason might be the presence of distortions in the energy 
prices due to state control. We omit its graphical analysis to save some space. 
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Table 4 
 Quantification of Output Loss 
 Contribution in Output Loss by 
Oil Price Shock Monetary Policy 
Shut-off Case 
Delayed Monetary Policy 
88% 
58% 
12% 
42% 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: Two lessons can be learned. First, the contractionary monetary policy is the prime contributor to output 
loss. Second, the output loss is higher if the endogenous monetary policy is working endogenously. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
After encountering the Lucas critique in the Sims and Zha (1996) counterfactual 
experiments, this study finds that around 42 percent of the output loss is due to the 
ensuing tight monetary policy. The important policy implication of this study is that the 
State (Central) Bank of Pakistan should not intervene in the market process if the general 
price level is increasing due to an oil price shock. Hence, if the State Bank intervenes in 
the market mechanism to control the rising inflationary expectations from the increasing 
oil prices, it would further increase output loss.  
As a higher interest rate increases the cost of doing business, resultantly it has a 
negative impact on business activity. The worst impact would be on investment which is 
much volatile to the increase in interest rate. Muhammad, et al. (2013) finds that a 1 
percent increase in interest rate reduces investment by 0.44 percent. This crowing out 
would curtail the role of private sector in the market. 
The macroeconomic effects of a demand based oil price shock are quite different 
in the presence of an ensuing tight monetary policy. After such an oil price shock, 
inflation rate and output both are expected to rise initially. However, given the 
commitment of a central bank to price stability, it increases interest rate to stabilise 
prices. As the investment is much volatile to increasing interest rate, output starts falling. 
The tight monetary policy hinders the economic growth rate and eventually results in 
output losses. 
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APPENDIX A  
IDENTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATE OIL PRICE INDICATOR 
It is not an easy task to uncover the appropriate measure for oil price shock. 
Change in the nominal oil price was the first indicator introduced by Hamilton (1983). 
However, this indicator was unable to add much in the empirical literature [Alquist and 
Coibion (2013); Hetzel (2013); Elwell (2013); Meltzer, et al. (2013); Prieto, et al. 
(2013)]. A more effective and comprehensive oil price shock indicator was required that 
could unearth the causal relationship among the macroeconomic variables. Subsequently, 
some other indicators such as log of the real oil price and log difference of real oil price 
among others were introduced. However, the most comprehensive and commonly used 
indicator is the Net Oil Price Increase (NOPI), presented by Hamilton (1996) [Lee, et al. 
(2001); Bernanke, et al. (1997)]. It is the log of the ratio of quarterly present time real oil 
price (denominated in local currency) to the previous year’s maximum level.  
The first task of this study, therefore, is to identify an appropriate indicator for oil price 
shock for Pakistan. Oil prices have asymmetric relationship with macroeconomic variables in 
Pakistan [Malik (2008)], and a positive change in the oil prices brings more variation in 
macroeconomic indicators than do the negative one [Hamilton (1996)]. Based on this 
reasoning, the Hamilton’s (1996) Net Oil Price Increase (NOPI) indicator appears to be most 
appropriate. Moreover, Hooker (1996) also finds that this indicator remains stable over time. 
However, in order to come up with concrete conclusion, other indicators mentioned in the 
previous paragraph are also analysed, by observing the impact of these indicators on output, 
prices and policy rate. For an indicator to be appropriate, it should decrease output, increase 
prices and interest rate in the face of a positive oil price shock. Given these criteria, we found 
that Hamilton’s (1996) NOPI is the most suitable indicator in this analysis because it produces 
the well behaved impulse responses in the face of oil shocks. 
 
APPENDIX B 
Fig. A1. Real and Nominal Exchange Rates Behaviours 
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Appendix Table 1 
 Regressions 
  GDP_L CPI_L NOPI CMR 
GDP_L(-1) 1.6 –0.4 –1.7 100.6 
  –0.1 –0.7 –6.9 –105.0 
  [ 12.1] [–0.6] [–0.2] [ 0.99] 
GDP_L(-2) –0.1 0.7 –11.0 –74.5 
  –0.3 –1.4 –14.5 –221.5 
  [–0.5] [ 0.5] [–0.7] [–0.3] 
GDP_L(-3) –1.0 –0.5 29.3 –159.1 
  –0.3 –1.5 –15.6 –239.2 
  [–3.2] [–0.3] [ 1.8] [–0.6] 
GDP_L(-4) 0.5 0.3 –17.5 160.0 
  –0.2 –0.8 –8.1 –124.6 
  [ 3.4] [ 0.4] [–2.1] [ 1.2] 
CPI_L(-1) –0.1 1.6 2.8 25.6 
  0.0 –0.2 –1.7 –25.6 
  [–2.3] [ 9.9] [ 1.6] [ 0.9] 
CPI_L(-2) 0.1 –1.0 –3.7 1.7 
  –0.1 –0.3 –3.1 –46.7 
  [ 2.1] [–3.5] [–1.2] [ 0.0] 
CPI_L(-3) 0.0 0.7 1.1 –36.9 
  –0.1 –0.3 –3.4 –51.4 
  [ 0.7] [ 2.0] [ 0.3] [–0.7] 
CPI_L(-4) –0.1 –0.3 0.4 –8.4 
  0.0 –0.2 –1.8 –28.0 
  [–2.8] [–1.6] [ 0.2] [–0.2] 
NOPI(-1) 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.9 
  0.0 0.0 –0.2 –2.4 
  [ 0.6] [ 0.7] [ 1.9] [ 1.2] 
NOPI(-2) 0.0 0.0 –0.1 2.3 
  0.0 0.0 –0.2 –2.5 
  [–1.4] [–1.2] [–0.8] [ 0.8] 
NOPI(-3) 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.2 
  0.0 0.0 –0.2 –2.6 
  [–0.4] [ 0.6] [ 0.4] [ 0.8] 
NOPI(-4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 
  0.0 0.0 –0.2 –2.3 
  [–0.7] [–0.6] [–0.3] [ 1.7] 
CMR(-1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
  0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 
  [–2.1] [–1.2] [–0.5] [ 1.6] 
CMR(-2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
  0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 
  [–0.9] [ 1.1] [ 0.5] [ 0.4] 
CMR(-3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
  0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 
  [–0.6] [–0.6] [–0.4] [ 0.7] 
CMR(-4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
  0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 
  [–0.3] [ 1.1] [–0.3] [ 3.7] 
C 0.0 –1.5 9.7 –289.9 
  –0.1 –0.6 –6.8 –103.9 
  [–0.3] [–2.3] [ 1.4] [–2.7] 
 R-squared 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.8 
 Adj. R-squared 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 
 Sum sq. resids 0.0 0.0 0.6 149.8 
 S.E. Equation 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.9 
 F-statistic 25423.2 2274.0 1.2 11.3 
 Log Likelihood 289.3 192.2 51.1 –112.6 
 Akaike AIC –9.1 –5.8 –1.1 4.3 
 Schwarz SC –8.5 –5.2 –0.5 4.9 
 Mean Dependent 13.9 4.7 0.1 8.8 
 S.D. Dependent 0.2 0.3 0.1 3.6 
Standard errors in ( ) and t-statistics in []. 
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